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This article reviews developments in international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and
joint ventures (JVs) during the year 2013.
I. Brazil
On August 1, 2013, the Brazilian National Congress enacted Federal Law No. 12,846/
13, which took effect January 29, 2014.1 This law regulates the civil and administrative
liability of companies for corrupt practices committed against Brazilian and foreign gov-
ernment entities and is known as the "Brazilian anti -corruption act."
The Brazilian anti -corruption act establishes strict liability of companies for the com-
mission of unlawful acts defined therein, but the responsibility of the company's adminis-
trators depends on the finding of fault. Therefore, there is no need to prove malicious
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intent or negligence by the company; however, it is necessary to prove the administrator's
culpability. 2
According to the Brazilian anti -corruption act, companies remain liable even in corpo-
rate reorganizations such as consolidations, mergers, and spin-offs. Their affiliates and
the members of a consortium are also jointly and severally liable for fines and damages,
regardless of whether such affiliates or members had any role in committing the offenses. 3
The Brazilian anti-corruption act defines the following administrative penalties: first, a
fine equivalent to 0.1 percent to 20 percent of the previous year's gross revenue, never less
than the value of the advantage obtained, and if gross revenues cannot be used as a param-
eter, a fine of six thousand Reais (R$6,000.00) to sixty million Reais (R$60,000,000.00);
second, the publication of the decision in a wide-circulation newspaper and on the compa-
nies' websites. 4
Entities may also be prosecuted in court and subject to other penalties, such as the
involuntary dissolution of the company, the forfeiture of its properties, rights or amounts
obtained as a result of the offenses, and an obligation to pay damages.5
Due to the enactment of the law, which makes successors liable for corrupt practices
previously committed, investors must evaluate potential liabilities related to the Brazilian
anti-corruption act prior to closing deals in Brazil. Therefore, specific anti-corruption
due diligence must be performed and specific representations and warranties made, espe-
cially if the target or its affiliates have a relationship with public entities in Brazil or
abroad. 6
Regarding the due diligence, it shall focus on business practices, compliance programs,
and programs on risk control. Interviews with administrators, employees, and external
auditors shall be included, as well as analysis of agreements signed with government bod-
ies and with members of consortia, and also analysis and evaluation of risks of administra-
tive proceedings and lawsuits in which the target may be involved.r
With respect to representations and warranties, the target shall represent for itself, its
affiliates and members of a consortia that they observe and are in compliance with the law.
Specific contractual remedies and guaranties may be agreed on in the event an offense is
revealed after the closing of the deal, and in case an offense is uncovered during the due
diligence process, the parties may negotiate the possibility of disclosure of information to
the authorities through a leniency agreement.8
The Brazilian anti -corruption act sets forth a five-year statute of limitation for offenses
counted as from the date the offense becomes known or in case of continued offense from
the date it has ceased. Therefore, the due diligence process as well as any representation
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In this instance, although the Brazilian anti-corruption act is not yet in force, it is
strongly recommended that for the transactions currently under discussion, analysis and
evaluation of issues arising from such law are made and that representations and warran-
ties related to anti-corruption matters are agreed upon by the parties and included in the
transaction documents.
II. Canada
A. INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: NEW RULES ON STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
In 2013, the Government of Canada tabled its budget implementation bill, which in-
cluded proposed amendments to the Investment Canada Act 10 (ICA), particularly in rela-
tion to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The amendments followed the Government's
2012 announcements that set out several new concepts, including the following:I
* a policy specific to the oil sands, pursuant to which acquisitions of control of oil sands
businesses by SOEs would now only be found to be of "net benefit to Canada" on an
exceptional basis;
* different review thresholds for SOEs versus non-SOEs acquisitions, with SOEs being
subject to a lower threshold for review;
* a clarification of the factors to be considered by the Government when reviewing an
SOE-investment.
In summary, the overall thrust of the amendments is clear; the Government is seeking
to maximize its discretion in dealing with SOEs. Key changes to the ICA are as follows:
* An SOE is defined broadly to include an entity that is controlled or influenced, di-
rectly or indirectly, by a foreign government or government agency, and also individ-
uals who are acting under the direction or direct or indirect influence of such a
government or agency. This potentially captures companies with tenuous connec-
tions to foreign governments. 12
* An entity that satisfies the Canadian status rules set out in the ICA can be deemed by
the Minister of Industry to be non-Canadian if the Minister determines that it is
controlled-in-fact by an SOE.13
* An investment by an SOE that falls underneath the acquisition of control threshold
can be deemed by the Minister to amount to an acquisition of control-in-fact by the
SOE.14
10. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) (Can.).
11. Investment Canada Act: Guidelines Investment by State-Owned Enterprises Net Benefit Assessment, IN
DUSTRY CAN. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/kOO064.html#p2.
12. Investment Canada Act, art. 1-3.
13. Id. art 26(2.31).
14. Id. art. 28(6.1).
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Finally, it is proposed that the threshold for review is altered from a "book value" test
(currently set at CAD $344 million) to an "enterprise value" test (starting at CAD $600
million). The existing "book value" threshold will be reserved for SOEs.15
B. ACTIVISM UPDATE
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued a decision in Wells v. Bioniche Life Sciences
Inc.' 6 that clarifies certain issues that both dissident shareholders and boards must deal
with in the face of contested meetings for a company incorporated under the Canada
Business Corporations Act17 (CBCA), finding the following:
* Only registered shareholders are entitled under the CBCA to requisition a share-
holder meeting.' 8
* A requisition must contain sufficient detail to allow shareholders to make an in-
formed decision about the business proposed in the requisition.' 9
* A requisitioning shareholder may be entitled to call its own shareholder meeting
under s. 143(4) of the CBCA even if the target's board is justified under the CBCA in
refising to call the meeting in response to the requisition.2 0
For target companies, this case highlights that a key tool for a board facing activist
pursuits is its ability to control the process. The board has the ability to determine the
validity of requests from shareholders and ultimately controls the meeting and proxy tabu-
lation process. In reviewing directors' conduct, courts will apply the business judgment
rule and will generally uphold determinations made by a board in the proper exercise of
their statutory obligations. 2
1
For dissident shareholders, this case highlights the need to be well advised and to ensure
compliance with technical legal requirements, which may result in losing procedural ad-
vantages. It also highlights that courts may be willing to intervene if a target company is
trying to frustrate a bona fide attempt by a shareholder to exercise its rights under corpo-
rate law.
III. Chile
The Chilean economy has remained strong this year in spite of the struggling European
economy and the debt ceiling crisis that affected the United States. In terms of M&A
activity, Chile has continued standing out as a main M&A player within the Latin Ameri-
can region, providing attractive investment opportnmities for foreign and local entrepre-
neurs. A healthy regulatory framework has played a crucial role in maintaining Chile as
the most investor-friendly country within the region, according to international think
15. Sandy Walker, SOE Amendments to Investment Canada Act Passed, DENTONS (July 18, 2013), http://www
.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2013/july/18/soe-amendments-to-investment-canada-act-passed.
16. Wells v. Bioniche Life Sci. Inc., [2013] ONSC 487 1, paras. 48-58 (Can. Ont.).
17. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
18. Wells, [2013] ONSC 4871, paras. 48-58.
19. Id. paras. 59-65.
20. Id. paras. 91-101.
21. See id.
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tanks. The Latin American Private Equity & Venture Capital Association's (LAVCA)
2013 Scorecard on the private equity and venture capital environment placed Chile at the
top of its rankings for the eighth consecutive year, and the Transparency International's
2012 Corruption Perception Index ranked Chile as the most transparent country in Latin
America, ranked 20 worldwide, just behind United States, which ranked 19.22
This year's legal developments have certainly improved the entrepreneurial environ-
ment. The most noticeable one is Law No. 20,659 (also known as the "One-Day Com-
pany Law") and its respective regulation, which simplifies company start-ups and M&A/
JV transactions given the possibility of using shelf companies. 23 Before these laws became
effective, Chile only counted with the general system for creating and amending compa-
nies, which is slow, owing to the registration with the Registry of Commerce and publica-
tion in the Official Gazette involved in the organization of a company.
With this new regime, company start-ups and amendments may now be performed in
only one business day, by providing an online form of articles and bylaws and an elec-
tronic online registry of legal entities. The rapidness is due to the fact that the online
registry is simultaneously connected with the Internal Revenue Service, which assigns the
taxpayer identity to the new company and approves its start-up.
2 4
Not only does this regime allow corporate acts-such as incorporations, amendments,
mergers, and liquidations-to be perfected in a limited amount of time, but also it has the
advantage of being very cost-effective because the online form and the registration process
are completely free of charge. Basically, the only expenses involved in this process are
those related with obtaining a digital signature for signing the online forms.25
While any type of legal entity (other than the public corporations) may benefit from
this system, the regulation has established different dates for the roll-out of the new sys-
tem. The legal entities currently benefitting from this new regime are limited liability
companies and individual limited liability enterprises.
In another important development, the Chilean Securities and Insurance Securities
Commission (SVS) is currently preparing a new regulation that intends to strengthen the
rules related to potential conflicts of interest of securities intermediaries and the perceived
abuse of holding company structures. 26 This new regulation comes as a reaction to the
recent trading and corporate scandal locally known as Caso Cascadas that involved the
public corporation SQM, where the board of SQM and well-known brokerage firms
where accused by minority shareholders of lack of transparency and allegedly executing
trades while having conflicts of interest. 2r
22. See LATIN AM. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, 2013 SCORECARD: THE PRIVATE EQ
UITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (2013), available at http:/lavca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/2013 -LAVCA- Scorecard.pdf.
23. Francisco Ugarte & Luciano Aguilera, Legal Innovations that Foreign Investors Should Consider, IFLR
1000, http://www.iflrl000.com/Legislati6onG ide/947/Legal-innovations-that-foreign-investors-should-con
sider.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Que es la SVS: Presentatidn [What is SVS: Presentation], SUPERINTENDENCIA VALORES Y SEGUROS,
http://www.svs.cl/portal/principal/605/w3-article-12389.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
27. Anthony Esposito & Felipe Iturrieta, Frustrated Shareholders Lash Out At Chile's Scandal-hit SQM,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/aricle/2013/10/1 /chile-sqm-idUSL1N011197
20131011.
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The new draft rule sets forth a series of obligations for securities intermediaries. 2
Firstly, securities intermediaries and their respective directors, managers, and administra-
tors must solve any potential conflict of interests that may arise in the performance of
their services, giving their clients prompt and sufficient information of the transactions
that they intend executing. Moreover, for the first time, securities intermediaries would
be responsible for setting whistleblower protection programs.
Secondly, in order for securities intermediaries to act in their client's best interest, the
new draft rule requires the parties to enter into a service agreement, containing clauses
that would solve potential conflict of interest between them, reporting obligations related
to purchase or sale for each product or type of service that the securities intermediaries
intend purchasing, and other obligations that securities intermediaries would need to
comply with (such as KYC requirements and offering their clients services or products in
accordance with their investment profile).29
Finally, the new rule requires each securities intermediary to establish a transaction
guideline, always benefitting the client instead of themselves. Also, each order and in-
struction received by the securities intermediary must be duly documented or supported
(including voice recordings) in order for them to be made available to the SVS, if
requested. 30
IV. France
The principle of legal autonomy of subsidiaries is widely accepted to avoid generating a
sense of insecurity among companies belonging to the same Group. The French Courts,
being filly aware of this dimension, have limited the cases in which a third party may
invoke the principle of liability of the parent company for the actions of its subsidiary.
Though the parent company is generally not held liable for the actions of its subsidiary,
there are three exceptions: 31
* non-contractual fault: for example, incitement to misconduct by interference;
* deceptive appearance: when evidence leads to a bona fide belief that the parent com-
pany and its subsidiary form one single legal entity; or
* interference in the external management of the subsidiary that brings into question
the subsidiary's legal autonomy.
Legal certainty in this field is fundamental; the doctrine is therefore carefil to adopt
accurate reasoning. In an effort to clarify matters, the French Courts have tried to clearly
separate the different criteria. The deceptive appearance requires several facts contribut-
ing to confusion between the legal personalities of the two entities. In order to consider
the conduct of the parent company as an interference, actions of the latter should
prejudice the interests of a third party by interfering in an agreement despite the subsidi-
28. SUPERINTENDENCIA VALORES Y SEGUROS, CIRCULAR No. 2108, DEFINE ALCANCE Y ESTABLECE
REQLTISITOS A LOS INTERMEDIARIOS DE VALORES Y ADMINISTRADORAS DE FONDOS, PARA EL EJERCICIO DE
LA ACTIVIDAD DE ADMINISTRACION DE CARTERA DE TERCEROS (June 14, 2013) (Chile).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., June 12, 2012, Bull. civ. IV, No.
121 (Fr.).
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ary's autonomy. 32 Purists have regretted that a recent Supreme Court judgment has con-
fised these two requirements.
In order to hold the parent company jointly and severally liable for convictions against
its subsidiary in relation to damages suffered by a commercial agent, the Court of Appeal
found that the parent company had regularly interfered in relations between its subsidiary
and the commercial agent. The parent company had addressed, on behalf of its subsidi-
ary, an extensive exchange of correspondence concerning the agreement between the sub-
sidiary and the commercial agent. All matters concerning the renegotiation of the
agreement had been carried out by the parent company directly, upon the initiative of its
managers. 33
The French Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal's decision, "as it has not
assessed whether the interfering conduct of Company P (the parent company) was of such
nature to create a deceptive appearance for Company M (the contracting party) resulting
in the legitimate belief that Company P was also party to the agreement. ' 34 The Supreme
Court thus created a cumulative requirement where interference does not suffice and must
trigger also deceptive appearance. 35
It is in the nature of each Group to restrict the autonomy of its subsidiaries through
supervision. By demanding that a number of requirements should be jointly met, the
Supreme Court has consolidated the principle of autonomy and has thus restrictively de-
fined the notion of interference.
The restrictive interpretation adopted by the Courts is welcomed as a positive contribu-
tion, as an increasing number of signs in favor of the extension of intragroup liability are
gradually emerging. For instance, under environmental laws, the parent company may be
held liable for expenses to repair sites that have been polluted by its subsidiary. 36 In the
employment law domain, the French Supreme Court will soon decide whether the liabil-
ity of a foreign subsidiary for gross negligence, pursuant to work conditions, may be ex-
tended to the parent company on the grounds of co- employment. 37
European Union (EU) Law goes in the same direction. Several European Court of
Justice judgments have endorsed the principle according to which where a parent com-
pany wholly owns a subsidiary that has breached EU Community provisions on competi-
tion matters, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company exercises a






36. See French Commercial Code-Article L.233-5-1; French Environment Code-Article L. 512-17.
37. La Justice Douche les Espoirs dEx-mineurs dAreva Victimes de Cancer ['ustice Showers Hopes of Ex-miner
Areva Cancer Victims], LE PAxmSIN (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-sante/la-justice-
douche-les-espoirs-d-ex-nineurs-d- areva-victimes-de-cancer- 25- 10- 2013- 3258 745.php.
38. See Case C-97/08, Azko Nobel v. Comm'n, 2009 E.CJ. 77.
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V. Germany
In sum, in 2013 the M&A market in Germany experienced a slight recovery compared
with the previous year. In the first three quarters of this year, M&A activities targeting
German companies saw a decline in the number of deals, but the deal values (totaling to
C58.6 billion) witnessed a 31.9 percent increase compared to the corresponding period in
2012. 39
A. MAJOR M&A TRANSACTIONS
Several major M&A transactions attracted attention in 2013. Most notably, M&A ac-
tivities in the telecommunications industry have marked the merger market record since
2001.4o
1. Vodafbne Group Plc/Kabel Deutschland Holding AG
With its 8.5 million users, Kabel Deutschland is the biggest cable network operator in
Germany. At the beginning, there were altogether three proposed purchasers in the com-
petition of acquiring Kabel Deutschland, namely the Liberty Global, Tele Columbus
GmbH, and Vodafone. Because the German Federal Cartel Office prohibited the acquisi-
tion by Tele Columbus GmbH and Liberty Global also withdrew its offer, Vodafone suc-
ceeded to acquire Kabel Deutschland. The transaction volume was C10.7 billion. This
acquisition is the highest valued deal for Germany in 2013. Now Vodafone holds about 75
percent of the shares of Kabel Deutschland.41
2. TeleJbnica Deutschland Holding AG/E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH & Co. KG
Another major transaction in the telecommunication industry was accomplished by
Telefonica Deutschland Holding AG, which has signed a contract to acquire its biggest
competitor in the market, E-Plus Mobilfumk GmbH & Co. KG. The Telefonica acquisi-
tion, valued at C8.55 billion, would reduce the number of mobile phone providers in Ger-
many from four to three. This deal still awaits the approval of the merger control
authorities and is expected to close in the middle of 2014.42
3. Reimann/D.E. Master Blenders
The German Reimann Family acquired through its holding company, Joh. A. Beckiser,
the Dutch coffee company D. E. Master Blenders 1753 for C7.5 billion. This transaction
is said to be the biggest deal in the food and beverage industry in 2013. Joh. A. Beckiser
after this acquisition is the sole owner of D. E. Master Blenders 1753.43
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4. BC Partners Ltd./Springer Science & Business Media GmbH
The London-based private equity firm BC Partners Ltd. acquired 100 percent of the
German publishing company Springer Science & Business Media GmbH for C3.3 billion.
Although Carlyle, KKR, Hellman & Friedman, and Providence were also interested in
acquiring Springer Science, the German academic publisher and professional media com-
pany finally fell into hands of BC Partners. Former owners EQT and Singaporean co-
investor GIZ remain involved with nearly 10 percent of Springer Science shares. 44
B. IMPORTANT CASE LAW
The German Federal Court confirmed in its recent judgment of September 17, 2013
(XI ZR 332/12) that shareholders are not entitled to claims for damages in case the ac-
quirer of a listed company fails to make public a mandatory offer in accordance with Sec-
tion Thirty-Five of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. 4 According to
this judgment, only the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)46 is empowered
to enforce the obligation to make a mandatory offer. Section Thirty-Five does not entitle
individual shareholders to claims for damages if this obligation is not filfilled by the
acquirer.
C. IMPORTANT CHANGES TO STATUTORY LAW
The recent statutory changes to the notary fees led to a new act governing court and
notary fees (Gerichts-und Notarkostengesetz issued July 23, BGBI. I S. 2586).47 The new
act will have an impact on the overall costs of having M&A transactions notarized in
Germany. A noticeable change is the maximum fee for having corporate decisions nota-
rized. While the former regulations provided a maximum fee of C5,000, the new act sets
an upper limit of the relevant business value in the amount of C5 million, which would
lead to a maximum notary fee of C16,270. Another major change is that the book value of
capital and real estate will no longer be relevant for determining the applicable notary
fees; instead, reference will be made to the fair value, which in most cases will lead to
higher notary fees. 4s
VI. Hungary
In March 2014, Hungary's new Civil Code will enter into force. The new Civil Code
will, inter alia, introduce important changes in the field of corporate law, as the amended
rules for companies will be incorporated into the Civil Code as part of its Third Book on
44. MERGER MKT., supra note 39.
45. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 17, 2013, Az XI ZR 332/12 (Ger.);
Wertpapiererwerbs-und Ubernahmegesetz [WpUG] [Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act] Dec. 20,
2001, BGBL. I at 3822 (Ger.).
46. BaFin is the shortened name for the Bureau of Finance, or the Bundesanstalt fiir Finanzwesen. See
BAFN, http://www.bafin.de (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
47. See generally Gerichts-und Notarkostengesetz [GNotKG] [Court and Notary Fees Act], Jul. 23, 2013,
BGBL. I. at 2586 (Ger.).
48. Id.
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legal persons. Some of the most important changes that are relevant for international
M&A transactions and for structuring joint ventures include the following. 49
A. PERMISSIVE RULES AS COMPARED TO PREVIOUS MANDATORY RULES
The most findamental (and most problematic) change will be that the new legislation,
similarly to the general contract law in Hungary, allows the parties to deviate, as a general
rule, from any relevant provisions of the new Civil Code and to freely determine their
own rules for rnamning the company, except if "(a) the deviation is expressly prohibited by
the Civil Code itself, or (b) the deviation obviously infringes the rights of creditors, em-
ployees or minority owners, or it impedes the exercising of statutory supervision over the
lawfil operation of the legal persons."5 0 Legal practice and jurisprudence will decide on a
case by case basis what the courts will consider as obviously infringing on the rights of
creditors, employees, or minority owners. It is very difficult to predict at this stage how
broad this new scope of possibilities to deviate really is, for example whether parties will
be able to deviate from the definitions of the various legal forms of companies.
A welcomed development in connection with such dispositive regulation is that compa-
nies limited by shares (Rszvenytarsasag or Rt. in Hungarian") will become equally flexible
as limited liability companies (Korldtolt Felelossegu Tarsasag or Kft. in Hungarian 2 ). Fur-
thermore, in addition to the customary types of shares, new types of shares can be created
by the statutes of the company. 53
B. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE No LONGER UNLAWFUL
Under the new rules, similarly to limited liability companies, privately held companies
limited by shares will also be able to grant financial assistance for the acquisition of their
shares. Public companies limited by shares will also be able to grant financial assistance
for third parties to acquire their shares on market conditions, from the free assets that can
be used for paying dividends, if the shareholders' assembly so approves by a 3/4-majority
vote upon the proposal of the board of directors. 54 Of course, liability rules will continue
to pose restrictions on such transactions, but this more permissible rule will greatly facili-
tate the financing of M&A transactions in Hungary. It will be the task of judicial practice
to work out the details of what qualifies as financial assistance and what can be considered
as market conditions.
49. See generally, POLGARI TORVtENYKONYV (Civil Code) 2013 6vi V. t6rv6ny (Hung.) [hereinafter The
New Civil Code].
50. See id. 3:4.§(3) (translation).
51. Share companies, or companies limited by shares, issue shares similar to the German AG issue shares.
Their owners are called shareholders and they have limited liability. Share companies can either be held
publically and abbreviated to Nyrt or they can be held privately, abbreviated to Zrt.
52. Similar to German GmbH, limited liability companies do not issue share certificates. Their owners,
called members or "quotaholders," have limited liability. DELOITTE, HUNGARY HIGHLIGHTS 2014 (2014),
available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-hungaryhigh
lights-2014.pdf.
53. See The New Civil Code 3:240.§.
54. See id. 3:227.§.
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C. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL, TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS, CALL AND PUT OPTIONS
The powers connected to the sale and purchase of assets, including shares, such as the
right of repurchase by the seller and put and call option rights may be contractually stipu-
lated for more than five years under the new Civil Code.55 Such option rights will become
marketable,5 6 which will make it more straightforward to regulate exit rights in the case of
joint ventures.
D. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
Under the new Civil Code, in addition to natural persons, legal entities will be able to
serve as executive officers or directors.5 7 Executive officers or directors will have a stricter
liability than they now have. They will only be exempted from liability against the com-
pany if the damage was caused by a circumstance beyond their control that could not be
foreseen and if it could not have been expected from the executive officer or director to
prevent the damage.5 8
VII. India
In 2013, there were certain changes in the legal and regulatory framework in India that
may impact cross-border M&A transactions. The amendments seem to have been made
with the intention to stimulate cross-border M&A by improving and aligning the relevant
laws.
A. THE COMPANIES ACT 2013
The Companies Act 1956 has been replaced by a new act (the 2013 Act), of which only
certain provisions have become effective5 9 The rest of the 2013 Act is expected to enter
into force in parts during the coming period. 60 The 2013 Act has introduced some impor-
tant changes to the regulations governing mergers in India. The 2013 Act now permits
Indian companies to merge with foreign companies (as opposed to only foreign companies
being permitted to merge with Indian companies previously), if the foreign company is
from a jurisdiction that has been notified by the Indian Government and subject to norms
to be put in place by the Reserve Bank of India (in its capacity as regulator of transactions
involving foreign exchange).6 1
Under the 2013 Act the procedure for mergers has been simplified. Certain types of
companies, such as a holding company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, can merge under
55. See The New Civil Code, 6:225.§. Compare this with the current Civil Code, 374.§(2) and 375.§(2),
which limited the term of option rights to five years. POLGARI TORVENYKONYVROL (Civil Code) t6rveny a
374.§(2) (Hung.) [hereinafter The Current Civil Code].
56. See The Current Civil Code, 373.§(4)-(5). These sections are missing from the new Civil Code.
57. See The New Civil Code, 3:22.§(2).
58. See id. 3.24.§, 6.142§.
59. Ministry of Corporate Affairs Notification, 2013, Gazette of India, section II(3)(ii) (Sept. 12, 2013).
60. KPMG, CoMPANIEs ACT 2013: NEW RULES OF THE GAME (Oct. 2013), availahe at http://www.kpmg
.com/IN/en/Documents/KPMGCompaniesAct 2013.pdf.
61. See The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, cl. 234(1), INDIA CODE (2013), vol. 27.
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a simplified and shorter procedure by entering into a so-called scheme of compromise or
arrangement (Scheme). 62 Obtaining the approval of the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT), which is a time consuming procedure, will no longer be required in these cases. 63
Under the 2013 Act, the right to object to the Scheme before the NCLT is now limited
to persons holding at least 10 percent of the shares or 5 percent of the total debt of the
company as per the latest audited financial statements.64 This change will most likely
reduce the amount of frivolous litigation against the Scheme.
The 2013 Act has also introduced provisions that may be viewed as being burdensome,
such as the requirement to convene a creditors or shareholders meeting, as the case may
be, for considering the Scheme 65 and to send the relevant documents to various authori-
ties such as the Reserve Bank of India, the Competition Commission of India, and certain
sectoral regulators for their consideration. 66 This will provide these authorities an oppor-
tnmity to raise objections to the Scheme, which may significantly increase the costs and
time involved with the merger process.
B. THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY
The definition of "control" in the Foreign Direct Investment Policy (the FDI Policy)
has been broadened. 67 Prior to the amendment, "control" was solely based on the power
to appoint the majority of the directors. According to the new definition, "control" also
exists if a party controls the management or policy decisions of the company, whether by
virtue of a shareholding, an agreement, or otherwise.
The definition of control is also relevant for the purpose of calculating an indirect for-
eign investment in an Indian company. In India, any downstream investment in an Indian
company by another Indian company that is owned or "controlled" by a non-resident is
considered to be an indirect foreign investment, in which case most provisions of the FDI
Policy that apply to actual foreign direct investment by a foreign entity should be com-
plied with.68 This change will also restrict transfers of shares in certain cases by a resident
to a non-resident.
62. See id. cl. 233.
63. KPMG, NEW COMRPANIES ACT, 2013 - INSIGHT SERIES (Aug. 23, 2013), availahie at https://www
.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndlnsights/AriclesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/india-sept20 201 3no
lcompanies.pdf.
64. The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, cl. 230(4), INDIA CODE (2013).
65. See id. cl. 230(1).
66. See id. cl. 230(5).
67. Press Release, Dep't of Indus. Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce & Indus., Press Note
No.4 (2013 Series) (Aug. 22, 2013), availahie at http://dipp.nic.in/English/actsrules/PressNotes/pn4_2013
.pdf.
68. See GIBSON DuNN, INDIAN GOVERNMENT AMENDS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY (Aug.
29, 2013), available at http://www.gibsondunm.com/publicafions/Documents/ndian-Government-Amends-
Foreign-Direct-Investment-Policy.pdf.
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C. TAKEOVER CODE
The Securities and Exchange Board of India amended the Takeover Code in early
2013.69 The most important change constitutes the entitlement of the acquirer of a listed
company in case of an open offer to acquire shares from the market prior to expiry of the
offer period. The acquirer can acquire shares through the preferential allotment route7°
or on the stock exchange, other than by way of block and bulk deals. 71 The intention
seems to be to restrict the acquirer from entering into any pre-negotiated market
purchases that may impact the rights of the other shareholders in the listed company who
may have agreed to tender shares in the open offer.
VIII. Singapore
A. SIC AUCTION FRAMEWORK-FRASER & NEAVE
In January 2013, the Securities Industry Council (SIC), a body that administers and
enforces the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (SG Takeover Code),72 issued
new guidelines (SIC Guidelines) 73 on a competitive bidding situation that had arisen in
relation to the takeover of Fraser & Neave, Limited (F&N), a company listed on the
Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited (SGX).
The transaction can be traced back to July 2012, when Oversea-Chinese Banking Cor-
poration Limited (OCBC) divested its shareholding in F&N and Asia Pacific Breweries
Ltd (APB) to certain companies linked to Thai billionaire Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi
(ThaiBev). 74 This acquisition by ThaiBev (which manufactures Chang Beer 75) compli-
69. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Amendment)
Regulations, 2013, Gazette of India, section 111(4) (Mar. 26, 2013).
70. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations,
2009, Gazette of India, section III(4)(2)(z) (Aug. 26, 2009) (" 'Preferential issue' means an issue of specified
securities by a listed issuer to any select person or group of persons on a private placement basis and does not
include an offer of specified securities made through a public issue, rights issue, bonus issue, employee stock
option scheme, employee stock purchase scheme or qualified institutions placement or an issue of sweat
equity shares or depository receipts issued in a country outside India or foreign securities.").
71. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Amendment)
Regulations, 2013, Gazette of India, section III(4)(3)(iii) (Mar. 26, 2013).
72. THE SINGAPORE CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (Apr. 9, 2012) (Sing.), available at http://www
.mas.gov.sg/-/media/resource/sic/Take over Code 9_Apr_2012.pdf.
73. See Press Release, Sec'y Indus. Council, Public Statement on Competitive Situation in Relation to
Fraser and Neave, Limited (Jan. 15, 2013), availahie at http://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/resource/sic/
press-releases/Publico20statemento20ono20Applied%20Auctiono20Procedure %20 15 %20Jan %202013
.pdf (Sing.).
74. See OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORP. LTD., DIVESTMENT OF SHAREHOLDINGS IN ASIA PACIFIC
BREWERIES LIMITED ("APB") AND FRASER AND NEAVE, LIMITED ("F&N") (July 18, 2012), available athttp:/
/www.ocbc.com/assets/pdf/Major / 2oRegulatory/2 012/2012 % 2007 % 20180% 20Divesrment% 20 of% 20 Share
holdingo20ino20APB %20and% 20FN% 20- % 20Conditional% 20SPA.pdfi
75. Beer, THAIBEv (2013), http://www.thaibev.com/enOS/product.aspx?sublvlglD= 1 (last visited Mar. 29,
2014).
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cated the relationship between F&N and Heineken N.V. (Heineken), which together had
joint control over APB, which brews Singapore's famous Tiger Beer.r 6
A takeover fight then ensued, and Heineken eventually took over F&N's stake in APB,
turning F&N into a substantial property holding company. Mr. Charoen then made his
first offer to purchase all the shares in F&N.r8 This was followed by a counter offer from
a consortium led by Overseas Union Enterprise Ltd (OUE).
On January 15, 2013, SIC issued the SIC Guidelines in the interest of providing cer-
tainty to F&N's shareholders.r9 The SIC Guidelines provided for an auction procedure
to be put into place should the two competing bidders fail to finalize their offers by Janu-
ary 20, 2013.80 The SIC Guidelines are noteworthy because, unlike the City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers of the United Kingdoms' and the Codes on Takeovers and Merg-
ers and Share Repurchases of Hong Kong, 82 which contain provisions on how to resolve a
competitive bid situation, the SG Takeover Code does not contain any express rules on
this.
This was the first time Singapore's SIC had provided guidelines for an auction proce-
dure in relation to a competitive bids situation. But the whole procedure was never actu-
ally put to the test as OUE let its offer lapse on January 21, 2013,83 enabling Mr. Charoen
to complete what has been billed as "Southeast Asia's Biggest Takeover."84
B. DESIGNATED SECURITIES-AsIASONS, BLUMONT, AND LIONGOLD
In October 2013, SGX triggered a rarely used provision in the SGX-ST Rules and
declared three Mainboard listed securities to be "Designated Securities."85 The relevant
Rule states that SGX
76. See Eveline Danubrata & Philip Blenkinsop, Heileke /W ins Tiger Battle; Focus Shifts to F&N Fight,
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-apb-shareholders-
idUSBRE88R05N20120928.
77. Neil Gough, Heineken Wins Asian Brewer for $4.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012, 1:20 AM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/heineken-wins-asian-brewer- for-4-6-billion/?-php=true&-type=blogs&-
r=0.
78. Joyce Koh, Charoens Fraser & Neave Takeover Was Years in the Making, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2013,
4:15 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-22/charoen-s-fraser-neave-takeover-was-years-in-the-
making.html.
79. Jeremy Grant, Singapore Regulator Calls for F&NAuction, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013, 3:16 PM), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e68b 1b4-5 f68-11 e2 -8250-00144feab49a.html#axzz2xNnal4Sv.
80. Press Release, Sec'y Indus. Council, supra note 72.
81. See PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www
.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/1 1/code.pdf (U.K.).
82. See SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, THE CODES ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND SHARE
REPURCHASES (June 2010), available at http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/pdf/sfcRegulatoryHandbook/EN H622
.pdf (H.K.).
83. OVERSEAS UNION ENTER. LTD, SGX-ST Grant of Waiver to Convene EGM (Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.oue.com.sg/doc/sgx-grant of waiver to conveneegm_290113.pdf.
84. Khettiya Jittapong, Thai Billionaire Charoen Builds Empire with F&N Takeover, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2013,
12:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/us-fraserandneave-billionaire-idUSBRE9OLO5W
20130122.
85. See SGX Declares 3 New Designated Securities, SINGAPORE Bus. REV. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://sbr.com.sg/
markets-investing/more-news/sgx-declares- 3 -new-designated-securities.
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may declare publicly a listed or quoted security or Futures Contract to be a "Desig-
nated Security" or "Designated Futures Contract" if, in its opinion, there has been
manipulation of the security or Futures Contract (or its underlying), excessive specu-
lation in the security or Futures Contract (or its underlying), or it is otherwise desira-
ble in the interests of markets established or operated by SGX-ST.86
The episode started on Friday, October 4, 2013, when trading in three shares was sus-
pended by SGX because of sharp price falls after a period of quick ascent when their share
prices increased by as much as 250 percent without any significant change in the funda-
mentals of these companies.8s The trading suspension was lifted by SGX over the week-
end, but the shares of these three companies were declared as "designated securities" on
October 6, 2013, with the following trading restrictions: (i) prohibited sale of shares unless
the seller holds the Designated Securities in the quantity to be sold; and (ii) prohibited
purchase of shares unless the buyer makes cash payment at the time of order execution.
SGX ended the designation of the three stocks on October 21, 2013.88
In the meantime, SGX had carried out a public consultation on the implementation of
circuit breakers, essentially a five-minute cooling-off period for shares that trade at more
than 10 percent of their price in the last five minutes.89 In view of the above, it is likely
that SGX may expedite the introduction of such circuit breakers.
IX. Sweden
A. AMENDMENT TO THE SWEDISH COMPANIES ACT
The board of directors of a Swedish aktiebolag (AB) has an obligation to act in a specific
prescribed manner in case of capital deficiency. 90 A board member failing to act in this
way or a managing director conducting business on behalf of the company with the
knowledge of such failure is jointly and severally liable for obligations incurred by the
company from the time of the failure to act until the time when the board of directors
takes the measure it previously failed to take. 9 1 On May 1, 2013, an amendment to the
Swedish Companies Act became effective, 92 introducing a specific shortened period of
limitation in relation to claims for damages against board members and the managing
86. SING. EXCH., RULES OF THE SINGAPORE EXCHANGE SECURITIES TRADING LIMITED, Rule 8.8.1
(Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://rulebook.sgx.com/en/display/display-viewall.html?rbid=327 1&element id=
1142 &print= 1 (Sing.).
87. See Chun Han Wong, Singapore Exchange to Lift Trading Curbs on Three Stocks, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct.
18, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/arcles/SB10001424052702304864504579143223373461
600.
88. See Shares of Blumont, LionGold, Asiasons Surge After SGX Lifts Trading Restrictions, AsIAONE Bus. (Oct.
21, 2013), http://business.asiaone.com/news/shares-blumont-liongold-asiasons-surge-after-sgx-lifts-trading-
restrictions.
89. See Eleni Himaras, Singapore Exchange to Add Circuit Breakers Next Month, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 22,
2014, 1:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014--0122/singapore-exchange-to-add-circuit-breakers-
next-month.hrml.
90. 25 ch. 18-20 §§ AKTIEHOLAGSLAGEN (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 2005:551) (Swed.).
91. Id.
92. See 25 ch. 20 § AKTIEBOLAGSLAGEN (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 2005:551).
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director. 93 Before the amendment, the general limitation period of ten years set out in the
Limitations Act applied.9 4 Through the amendment, an action for damages against a
board member or managing director must be initiated in court within three years from the
date when such failure to act occurred. 9 Hence, the amendment reduces the liability of
the representatives of the company and forces creditors seeking damages to take action
sooner.
B. CASE LAW PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In a recent judg-ment, 9 6 the Swedish Environmental Court of Appeal pierced the corpo-
rate veil and held a parent company liable for environmental liabilities of its subsidiary.
The subsidiary, which was responsible for the contamination of a lake, had been liqui-
dated. 97 The court initially established that the subsidiary, before it was put into liquida-
tion, had incurred losses for several years and that its continued business had been made
possible by the parent company granting the subsidiary shareholders' contributions. 98
The court held that the parent company, through its shareholders' contributions and
through its position as the sole shareholder, was to be regarded as operator and hence was
liable for the decontamination of the area polluted by the subsidiary. 99 The doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil has been developed through case law and is not codified in
either the Swedish Environmental Code' 0 0 or in the Swedish Companies Act, 10 1 and as a
result, the judgment is more far reaching than previous case law. From an M&A perspec-
tive, this judgment implies that a buyer must take into account that it may also be liable
for the environmental liabilities of its subsidiaries. The judgment also calls for increased
awareness for those contemplating financing an insolvent or nearly insolvent subsidiary.
X. The Netherlands
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Dutch corporate law has undergone significant changes in the past couple of years. The
year 2013 was no exception. Following more flexible rules for Dutch private limited lia-
bility companies creating the so-called "Flex BV" in 2012,102 2013 was characterized by
firther changes in corporate governance laws. The international relevance of these devel-
opments is underlined by a trend in the Dutch M&A market, with markets seeing an
increased use of Dutch companies as acquisition vehicles and ultimate holding companies
93. LAG OM M'JDRING I AKTIEBOLAGSLAGEN (2005:551) (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] (2013:143).
94. See PROPOSITION [Prop.] 2012/2013:65 F6rkortad rid f6r styrelseledm6ternas personliga betalningsan-
svar [government bill].
95. See 1, 5, 6 §§ PRESKRIPTIONSLAG (Svensk fdrfattningssamling [SFS] 1981:130) (Swed.).
96. Fastighetsdomstolar [VD] [land courts] 2012-11-26 ref 11429-12 (Swed.).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 9-10.
99. Id. at 10.
100. Id. at 8.
101. PROPOSITION [Prop.] 2004/2005:85 Ny aktiebolagslag [government bill] at 205 (Swed.).
102. Wet vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering bv-recht [Act on Simpler and More Flexible Private Limited
Liability Companies], Stb. 2012, p. 299 (Neth.).
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in cross-border mergers. 03 This emphasizes the position of the Netherlands-with its
extensive double taxation and bilateral investment protection treaty network-as a juris-
diction that can have a key role in cross-border deals. A current topic of public debate is
the requirement that Dutch holding companies have sufficient substance in the Nether-
lands.104 The most important changes to Dutch corporate governance legislation in 2013
were introduced by the Management and Supervision Act' 0 and the Corporate Govern-
ance Act.' 06
B. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION AcT
The Management and Supervision Act provides for more flexibility in the governance
organization of a Dutch company; in addition to the traditional two-tier board system
with separate management and supervisory boards, a one-tier board comprising both ex-
ecutive and non-executive directors now has an explicit statutory basis.' 0 In a cross-bor-
der context, this often fits better in the global organization of the company, in particular if
foreign regulatory requirements apply that are designed for a one-tier board system. In
addition, the provisions regarding a conflict of interest between the company and mem-
bers of its board have been amended. 08 Instead of a rule with external effect restricting
the management board's authority to represent the company in case of a conflict of inter-
est, there is now a rule with internal effect restricting only the authority of the relevant
(management or supervisory, or one-tier) board member to participate in the decision-
making process.' 09 The Management and Supervision Act also imposes a maximum on
the number of board positions that managing/executive or supervisory/non-executive di-
rectors of Dutch companies that are deemed "large" based on certain criteria may hold
with other such "large" Dutch companies." 0
103. Cf Manuela Mesco & Gilles Castonguay, Fiat Industrial, CNH Reach Merger Deal, WALL ST. J (Nov.
26, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732446930457814280
3917955958 (noting the merger of Fiat and CNH); Suzanne Vranica, Publicis, Omnicom Agree to Merge, WALL
ST. J. (July 27, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/aricles/SB100014241278873245647045786318
42380606794 (detailing the merger of Publicis and Omnicom); Mark Scott, Deutsche Borse to Appeal Blocked
Merger with NYSE Euronext, N.Y. TlvimEs (Mar. 20, 2012, 7:04 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/
20/deutsche-borse-to-appeal-blocked-merger-with-nyse-euronext/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (discuss-
ing the proposed merger between NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Brse).
104. See Letter from Frans Weekers, State Sec'y of Fin., Neth. and Lilianne Ploumen, Minister of Foreign
Trade and Dev. Cooperation, Neth., to President of the Lower House of the States Gen. and President of the
Upper House of the States Gen. (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://www.government.nl/documents-and-
publications/parliamentary-documents/2013/09/09/government-s-response-to-the-report- from-seo-econom
ics-amsterdam-on-other-financial-institutions-and-the-ibfd-report on-developing-countries.htm (regarding
Dutch substance requirements and the role of the Netherlands in the international tax sphere).
105. Wet Bestuur en Toezicht [Management and Supervision Act], Stb. 2011, p. 275 (Neth.).
106. Wet Corporate Governance [Corporate Governance Act], Stb. 2012, p. 588 (Neth.).
107. See BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BA] [Civil Code] art. 2:129a (Neth.); see also BURGERLIJK WETBOEK
[BW'] [Civil Code] art. 2:239a (Neth.).
108. Id. arts. 2:129(6), 2:239(6).
109. Id.
110. Id. arts. 2:132a, 2:242a.
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C. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACT
By increasing the threshold from 1 percent to 3 percent of the company's issued share
capital which gives minority shareholders the right to add agenda items for upcoming
shareholder meetings, the Corporate Governance Act reduces minority shareholder rights
in publicly listed companies (NVs) in the Netherlands."' The minimum threshold for
disclosure of shareholdings in Dutch listed companies has been decreased from 5 percent
to 3 percent." 2 The disclosure obligation will apply to both gross long and gross short
positions." 3 New transparency rules include a procedure allowing Dutch listed compa-
nies to identify their shareholders who hold an interest of 0.5 percent or more of the
company's issued share capital in advance of an upcoming general meeting of sharehold-
ers.11 4 Finally, the new rules create a mechanism to enhance information exchange be-
tween a listed company and its investor base. Investors holding at least 1 percent of the
company's issued share capital or shares with a market value of at least C250,000 may
require that the company pass on certain information regarding an agenda item to the
other shareholders, unless there is a statutory ground for refisal."'
XI. Ukraine
The Ukrainian M&A market showed some activity in 2013, mainly in the agriculture
and energy sectors (which are traditional for Ukraine), as well as in the banking, commu-
nication, and information technology (IT) sectors. The latter is also due to tax preference
in the IT sphere effective on January 1, 2013.116
Large Russian and Ukrainian financial industrial groups still remain the main players on
the Ukrainian market. The number of Ukrainian groups continues to grow due to lobby-
ing and protection of their interests on the governmental level. European banks are grad-
ually diminishing their presence in Ukraine, selling their shares to Ukrainian tycoons.
This is not surprising, as foreign investors are still worried by the slow-moving Ukrainian
M&A market and by some peculiarities of the legal framework outlined below.
A. NON-FLEXIBLE CORPORATE AND LABOR LEGISLATION
Corporate legislation sets forth rigid rules regarding, among other things, management
bodies, quorums of shareholders' meetings, voting, and distributions of dividends. The
Labor Code is de facto a Soviet inheritance, with limited possibilities of owners to dismiss
a CEO under their own initiative and far-reaching powers of trade unions (e.g., to demand
111. See Wet op het financieel toezicht [Financial Services Act], Stb. 2012, p. 588 (Neth.); see also BURGER
LIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Civil Code] art. 2:114a(2) (Neth.). It is at the company's discretion to keep the 1
percent threshold by including this in its articles of association. See id.
112. See Wet op het financieel toezicht [Financial Services Act] at 588 (Neth.).
113. Id.
114. Wet Corporate Governance [Corporate Governance Act], Stb. 2012, p. 588 (Neth.).
115. Id. art. 49c.
116. Pro Vnesema Zmin do Rozdilu XX Perehidn Polo enna Podatkovogo Kodeksu Ukraini Sodo Osob-
livostej Opodatkuvama Sub'ektiv Industr!i Programnof Produkii [On Amending Chapter XX "Transitional
Period Provisions" of Tax Code of Ukraine Regarding Tax Treatment of Entities of Software Products Indus-
try], Vi domosti Verhovnoi Radi Ukraini (BBP) [Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada], July 5, 2012, No. 5091-VI
(Ukr.), available at http://zakonl.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5091-17.
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dismissal of the CEO under certain circumstances).17 Trade unions showed much activity
in 2013, protesting against the new draft Labor Code and flexing their muscles in con-
frontations with major retail networks and the metal industry (in the latter case even rais-
ing re-privatization)." 8
B. DISPUTABLE APPLICABILITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS
AGREEMENTS
Shareholders agreements are likely to be held invalid in Ukraine if deemed contrary to
Ukrainian corporate laws. Moreover, it is also expressly forbidden that shareholders
agreements regarding Ukrainian companies are governed by foreign law or envisage set-
tlement of disputes in international arbitration courts.119 Consequently, joint ventures are
often structured under foreign jurisdictions (at the level of a foreign holding company
governed by foreign law) to fully benefit from such agreements. 20
C. MERGER CLEARANCE
Though the authority's practices have been so far modest, we expect material fines in
the merger control sector taking into account the recent trends on the other infringe-
ments of antitrust laws (cartels, abuse of dominance, unfair competition cases announced
in 2012-2013). A transaction must be notified with the Antimonopoly Committee of
Ukraine (the AMCU), if the parties meet certain statutory thresholds. The following
thresholds apply: (i) the group threshold (C12 million in assets or annual revenues for the
parties combined), (ii) the proportionality threshold (Cl million in assets or annual reve-
nues for each party), and (iii) the Ukrainian threshold (Cl million in assets or annual
revenues in Ukraine for any party).121 The parties are obliged to notify the intended
transaction regardless of whether any Ukrainian assets are involved. Currently the
AMCU are especially interested in foreign -to-foreign transactions.122
Another important detail raising issues is joint venture establishment qualification
(double treatment of joint ventures as either a merger or concerted practices). The liabil-
117. KODEKS ZAKONiV PRO PRACO UKRAINrI [Labor Code], Dec. 10, 1971, No. 322-VIII (Ukr.), available at
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/322 -08.
118. Ukraine Union: Economic Fairness Over Austerity, Autocracy, SOLIDARITY CTR. (Dec. 2, 2013), http://
www.solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?contentid= 1756.
119. Anna Babych & Oksana Krasnokutska, 2014 Mergers and Acquisitions Report: Ukraine, IFLR (Mar. 1,
2014), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3322283/2014-Mergers- and-Acquisiti6ons-Report-Ukraine.html.
120. Pro Praktiku Rozgladu Sudami Korporativnih Sporiv [On the Practice of the Courts of Corporate
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ity for breaches of the filing obligation can amount to 5 percent of the merging parties
annual revenues.1 23 In absence of a transparent calculation methodology, the agency has
much discretion in determining amounts and the basis for their calculation.124
D. INFORMATION ON BENEFICIAL OWNERS
The last, yet definitely not the least, issue worth noting is the recent great attention of
the AMCU to the ultimate beneficial owners (UlBOs) of parties to transactions. The
AMCU is planning to take serious steps in this direction in the nearest fiture, namely to
adopt amendments to the current laws providing for the possibility to block transactions
of merging parties hiding their beneficiaries offshore.12 A similar regulation has recently
been introduced in Russia.' 26 A similar requirement can also be found in banking rules
following the compliance with the anti-money laundering program (most foreign inves-
tors have already faced the requirement to disclose its UBOs while opening a bank ac-
count in Ukraine). 27 These rules are quite usual for international best practices but are a
new development for Ukraine.
XII. United States
A. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
In SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. Pharmathene, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held that an
agreement to negotiate in good faith can be binding and the breaching party liable for
expectation damages.' 28 The parties entered into merger and bridge loan agreements in
which they agreed to negotiate in good faith a license agreement based on the terms of an
unsigned term sheet if the merger did not close. When the merger agreement was termi-
nated, SIGA proposed license agreement terms materially different from those in the un-
signed term sheet and refised to negotiate on the basis of the unsigned term sheet. The
court held that an "express contractual obligation" to negotiate in good faith is a binding
obligation, which a party breaches when it, in bad faith, offers terms "substantially dissimi-
lar" to the preexisting term sheet. 129 If the parties would have reached an agreement had
the defendant negotiated in good faith, the plaintiff is entitled to expectation damages.
123. Zakon Ukraini Pro Zahist Ekonomicnoi Konkurencil [On Protection of Economic Competition], No.
2210-III at art. 52.
124. Id.
125. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: UKRAINE 56 (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
ditcclp2013 d3_en.pdf.
126. Finance Ministry Plans To Close Tax Loophole For Offshore Real Estate Deals, Moscow TIMES (Jan. 29,
2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.themoscowimes.com/business/article/finance-ministry-plans-to-close-tax-loop
hole- for-offshore-real-estate-deals/493535.html.
127. Pro Zatverd_ema Instrukci' Pro Poradok Vidkritt, Vikoristama I Zakritta Rahunkiv U Naci onalNij
Ta Jnozemnih Vafitah [On Approval of the Instruction on the Procedure of Opening, Use and Closure of
Accounts in Local and Foreign Currencies], Pravlh man Nac onalNogo Banku Ukraini Postanova [Resolution
of Board of National Bank of Ukraine], Nov. 12, 2003, No. 492 (Ukr.), available at http://zakonl.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/z 172 -03.
128. SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 350-51 (Del. 2013).
129. Id. at 343-44, 346.
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In re Plains Exploration & Production Company Stockholder Litigation, a Delaware Chan-
cery Court decision, validated a corporation's single-bidder sale strategy.1 30 Plains con-
sidered merging with Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. and allowed Flores
(Plains' CEO, President, and Chairman) to lead the negotiations, even though Flores an-
ticipated becoming Freeport's Vice Chairman and one of its CEOs after the merger.
Plains' Board did not shop the company, request a go-shop period, or perform a market
check. Concluding that Plains' Board did not breach its Revlon duties, the court stated
that boards need not always establish special committees, perform market checks, or shop
their companies, including when almost all the directors are disinterested and a board has
both "reliable evidence" to evaluate a transaction and "flexibility" to respond to subse-
quent bidders.131 Furthermore, it may be acceptable for management to lead negotia-
tions, and the Board mitigated Flores's conflict of interest by supervising the negotiations.
Another noteworthy Delaware Chancery Court decision, In re MFW Shareholders Liti-
gation,132 clarified when a controlling stockholder may accomplish a merger and be subject
to the business judgment rule standard of review, instead of the entire fairness standard of
review. MacAndrews & Forbes, a holding company, owned 43 percent of M&F World-
wide and offered to purchase the remaining shares for a premium in a going private
merger. MacAndrews and Forbes insisted that the transaction be approved by both an
independent special committee and a majority of disinterested stockholders, but minority
stockholders sued, alleging that the merger was not fair. The Chancery Court concluded
that the business judgment rule applies to a controlling stockholder merger when the
controlling stockholder conditions the transaction on approval by both a special board
committee and a majority of the minority stockholders. The special committee must be
independent, must be able to choose its own advisors and to reject the transaction if it
chooses, and must satisfy its duty of care. Similarly, the minority stockholder vote must
be informed and must not be coerced.
B. LEGISLATION
On August 1, 2013, Delaware General Corporation Law Section 251(h) became effec-
tive, streamlining second-step mergers following recommended tender offers.133 Before
the enactment of Section 251(h), a bidder needed to acquire at least 90 percent of a Dela-
ware corporation's voting shares in order to accomplish a short-form merger without a
stockholder vote. 134 Such a vote could delay the achievement of fill ownership for several
months after a successfil tender offer. As a result of the new statute, a bidder owning the
number of voting shares necessary to approve a merger after a tender offer (usually a
majority) may in many cases effect a back-end merger without a target stockholder vote.
To take advantage of Section 25 1(h), the parties must, among other things, state expressly
in the merger agreement that this section governs the merger.
130. In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124, at
*11 (Del. Ch. 2013).
131. Id. at *5.
132. In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013).
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (West 2013).
134. See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 54 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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